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1. Introduction 
Power is a core concept for the analysis and design of organisations. The lit-
erature contains a wide variety of contributions from various disciplines 
dealing with different types and aspects of power in organisations. These 
can broadly be classified by a combination of two features: the subject of the 
analysis and its primary origin (Morriss 1987/2002: 107f). The subject is 
either the possession of power or its exercise and its primary origin is either 
an individual or a position in an organisation. That is, power is taken to be 
rooted in an individual or a position. 
Based on these two features, the literature can, in very general terms, be 
said to consist of four categories: studies on (i) positional power, (ii) indi-
vidual power, (iii) the exercise of positional power, and (iv) the exercise of 
individual power. This paper is devoted to the study of the first category. 
Positional power is what results from the interplay of two components of an 
organization’s architecture: the arrangement of positions in the organiza-
tion and the decision-making mechanisms in use.  
It is well recognized that the organisational architecture and its resulting 
power structure are essential ingredients for the success of an organisation 
(Brickley et al. 2004; Daudi 1986; Johnston and Gill 1993; Martin 1998). Al-
though there exists plenty of work addressing the positional power relations 
in organisational architectures,1 very little attention has been given to 
investigating such power relations in hierarchical organisations i.e. where 
there are dominance relations among the actors. This would be unremark-
able if hierarchies would not play a significant role in social life. But the op-
                       
1 See, for instance, Felsenthal and Machover (1998), Holler and Owen (2000, 2001, 2002), 
Holler et al. (2002), Holler and Gambarelli (2006), and the references therein. 
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posite is true: hierarchies can be found in all areas of social life.  
One of the problems with most of the extant literature on positional 
power in hierarchies is that it is restricted to the analysis of power only in 
terms of the arrangement of the actors.2 While such an analysis informs us 
about the authority structure within an organisation, it ignores the decision-
making mechanisms completely.  
To the best of our knowledge, only a handful of studies on positional 
power in hierarchies take into account the decision-making mechanisms 
(van den Brink 1994, 1997, 1999, 2001; Gilles et al. 1992; Gilles and Owen 
1994; van den Brink and Gilles 1996; Berg and Paroush 1998; Shapley and 
Palamara 2000a,b; and Steffen 2002). All these studies make use of adapta-
tions of well-established approaches for the analysis of power in non-hierar-
chical organisations such as the Banzhaf (1965) measure;  and thus they are 
all based on the structure of a simple game, i.e. they are ‘membership-based ’. 
Roughly speaking, in such a set-up power is ascribed to an actor i, if i has 
the potential to alter an outcome that has been forced by some members of 
the organisation, by either leaving or joining the subset of actors which has 
effected the present outcome. In the course of our analysis we will demon-
strate that such an approach is in general inappropriate for characterizing 
power in hierarchies. 
To deal with the problem of how to characterize power relations in a 
hierarchy, we develop an action-based approach based on an extensive game 
form. Here power is ascribed to an actor i, if i has the potential to alter an 
outcome forced by the members of the organisation by altering his action. 
A similar action-based approach has been already suggested for decision-
making mechanisms in non-hierarchical set-ups (Miller 1982), but has so far 
received only little attention in the literature as it was regarded as an equiva-
lent representation of the membership-based approach. Our analysis will 
demonstrate that this equivalence only holds for a certain class of decision-
making mechanisms and that the membership-based approach in contrast 
to the action-based cannot be extended to a class of decision-making 
mechanisms which allow certain actors to terminate a decision on behalf of 
the hierarchy before all other members have been involved. This kind of 
decision-making mechanism is particularly relevant for hierarchies. 
The contribution of our paper can be summarized as follows: (i) We ar-
gue that the existing membership-based approaches for the analysis of posi-
tional power in hierarchies are only relevant for a (less important) subclass 
of decision-making mechanisms in hierarchies. (ii) We show that an ade-
quate consideration of the more relevant mechanisms requires an action-
based approach represented by an extensive game form. (iii) We extend the 
                       
2 See, for instance, Copeland (1951), Russett (1968), Grofman and Owen (1982), Daudi 
(1986), Brams (1968), van den Brink (1994, 2002), van den Brink and Gilles (2000), Mizruchi 
and Potts (1998), Hu and Shapley (2003), Herings et al. (2005), and the references therein. 
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existing action-based approach which has been formulated for strategic 
games forms to extensive game forms. (iv) We illustrate that the existing 
membership-based approaches can be represented as special cases of the ac-
tion-based approach.  
2. Directed Graphs 
Given that we will represent both the description of the arrangements of the 
actors and decision-making mechanisms in hierarchical organisations by di-
rected graphs – the two are not necessarily identical – we start by briefly re-
calling some definitions of such graphs. A directed graph (or digraph) is a 
set of objects, called nodes joined by directed links called arcs. 
Formally, a digraph is an ordered pair ( , ),V D  where V  is a finite set of 
nodes (or vertices) of the graph and D  is a set of ordered pairs of V  called 
arcs of the graph, i.e. ⊆ ×D V V  is a binary relation on V . An arc 
( , )i j ∈ D  is considered to be directed from node i to node j where i is 
called a predecessor of j and j is called a successor of i in D . By ( )iS  and 
-1( )iS , respectively, we denote the set of all successors and predecessors of 
i ∈ V  in D ; i.e. { }( ) ( , )i j i j= ∈ ∈S V D  and { }1( ) ( , ) .i j j i− = ∈ ∈S DV  
A node i is called a terminal node, if no arc is starting from it, i.e. ( ) .i = ∅S  
If ( , ) ,i j ∉ D  we say that there exists a path from i to j denoted by 
( , ) ... ,defi j i j= → →P  if i j≠  and j can be reached from i by following 
arcs of the graph, e.g. if ( , ),( , ) ,i h h j ∈ D  then ( , ) .i j i h j= → →P  If such a 
path ( , )i jP  exists, we call i and h ancestors of j, and h and j descendants of i. 
Moreover, the set of all nodes being descendants of a node i is denoted by 
(ˆ )iS  and the set of all ancestors of i by 1ˆ ( ).i−S  If, instead, ( , ) ,i j ∈ D  we 
say that ( , )i jP  denotes a direct path, and if ( , ) ,i j ∉ D  but ,i j=  we say that 
( , )i jP  denotes a degenerated path. 
A directed graph is said to be a tree T  if (i) there exists a distinguished 
node r ∈ V  (the root of the tree) that has no arcs going into it, and (ii) for 
every other node { }\i r∈V  there exists exactly one path from r to i. 
Furthermore, a tree T  becomes a labelled tree denoted by the triple 
( , , ),l lV DT  if there exist labelling functions :l →V VV L  and 
:l →D DD L with VL  and DL  being the corresponding sets of labels. 
Moreover, a branch of a tree T  is a directed graph having nodes starting 
at a node i ∈ V  and containing all its descendents together with their origi-
nal arcs. By iT  we denote the branch starting at i. Thus, iT  is itself a tree, 
the root of which is i. 
3. Hierarchies 
Hierarchies form a certain subclass of organisational architectures. Following 
van den Brink (1994) they distinguish themselves from other architectures 
by the arrangement of its members being connected via directed relations, 
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which we interpret as dominance (or superior to) relations. Loosely speaking, 
we can say that an actor i in a dominating position has an influence on the 
‘powers’ of other actors who are in positions that are dominated by i. 
Domination can be either indirect or direct, i.e. with or without intermediate 
actors, respectively. Note, that if we just make use of the term ‘domination’ 
without further specification, we allow for indirect and direct domination.  
Actors in dominating positions are called superiors (or principals) - bosses 
or managers in common parlance -, while the actors in dominated positions 
are called subordinates (or agents). If we refer to a superior who directly 
dominates another actor, the dominating actor is called a predecessor, and if 
we refer to a subordinate who is directly dominated by another actor, the 
dominated actor is called a successor. 
Formally, we can represent the dominance structure of a hierarchy as a 
digraph, where the nodes j ∈V  represent the actors ,i N∈  i.e. 
: ,l N→V V  and the arcs indicate direct dominance relations between the 
actors, i.e. if there is an arc ( , )i j ∈ D  predecessor i dominates successor j 
and that j is dominated by i. Moreover, we say j (ˆ )i∀ ∈ S  that j is a subordi-
nate of i, and j 1ˆ ( )i−∀ ∈ S  that j is a superior of i.  
The dominance relations in a hierarchy are assumed to fulfil the follow-
ing three properties (see Radner 1992 for a similar set of properties): 
Property 3.1 (Transitivity) If i dominates j, and j dominates k, then i 
dominates k. 
Property 3.2 (Anti-symmetry) If i dominates j, then j cannot dominate i. 
Note that by Property (3.1) in combination with (3.2) we assume 
 ˆ: ( ),i N i i∀ ∈ ∉ S  i.e. we exclude the case that a dominance structure is cy-
clic. 
Property 3.3 (Single Topness) There is exactly one actor, called the top 
(or root), who is in a position such that he dominates all other actors. Except 
for the top, every other actor has at least one predecessor. Thus, formally, 
there exists an i N∈  such that { }(ˆ ) \i N i=S  and 1ˆ ( ) .i− = ∅S  
For an illustration Figure 1 depicts all feasible dominance structures of 
hierarchies with two and three members (except structures with relabelled 
members) which fulfil properties (3.1)–(3.3). Formally, for Figure 1a these 
are given by { }( )a b=S  and ( ) ,b = ∅S  for Figure 1b by { }( ) ,a b=S  
{ }( )b c=S  and ( ) ,c = ∅S  and for Figure 1c by { }( ) ,a b c=S  and 
( ) ( ) .b c= = ∅S S  
Note that the dominance relations in a hierarchy cannot always be repre-
sented by a tree, i.e. it is not necessarily the case that except for the top each 
other actor has one and only one predecessor. In other words, dominance 
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relations which can be represented by a tree form a subclass of all feasible 
sets of dominance relations fulfilling properties (3.1)–(3.3). 
As a dominance structure is only a partially ordered set, not all actors in a 
hierarchy are necessarily comparable in terms of their bare dominance re-
lations. For instance, in Figure 1c, b does not dominate c, nor does c domi-
nate b (Radner 1992: 1391). However, in everyday language, the word hier-
archy not only connotes an upside-down-tree-like dominance structure, but 
also an assignment of rank which allows for a certain mode of comparison 
of the positions of b and c. By a ranking of a dominance structure we shall 
mean an assignment of a natural number called the rank (or level) to each 
actor, such that: 
Property 3.4 i has a higher rank (larger number) than j, if i dominates j. 
Property 3.5 i and j have the same rank, if i does not dominate j nor j 
dominates i, i.e. if i and j are not comparable in terms of the dominance re-
lations, and the length of the longest path to the top is the same for both. 
While properties (3.4) and (3.5) are sufficient for existence of a ranking, 
they are only necessary but not sufficient for a unique ranking. Throughout 
this paper we will make use of a unique ranking which additionally satisfies 
the following properties:3 
Property 3.6 There is only one actor with the highest rank k called the top. 
Property 3.7 Recursively, an actor has rank 1l k≤ −  iff all his predecessors 
have a rank 1h l≥ +  and at least one of his predecessors has rank 1.l +  
                       
3 Note, that with these properties we exclude hierarchies which contain direct dominance 
relations over more than one rank (Radner 1992: 1391). While we impose this restriction to 
keep the exposition of our paper traceable, this does not imply that our approach is not capa-
ble to take such hierarchies into account. 
Fig. 1b
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b
c
Fig. 1a
a
b
Fig. 1c
a
b c
 
Fig. 1. Feasible dominance structures with two and three actors 
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Property 3.8 We fix k such that the lowest ranked actor has rank 1. 
An actor is said to be at the bottom (or a leaf) if he does not dominate any 
other position, i.e. if he owns a terminal node. Note that this does not imply 
that such a position necessarily belongs to the lowest rank 1. 
4. Decision-Making Mechanisms in Hierarchies 
Decision-making mechanisms are the other component of an organisation’s 
architecture that we need to examine. For the definition of a decision-mak-
ing mechanism let us start with the general definition of a decision: 
Definition 4.1 A decision is the choice of a non-empty proper sub-set of 
elements out of a set of elements. 
In our case the sets of elements from which an actor can choose is cre-
ated by proposals submitted to the organisation. The chosen (or selected) 
elements are outcomes produced by members of an organisation. The 
choices are made by one or more actors belonging to the organisation 
where each of these actors has to perform an action to make his individual 
choice effective. How those actions and the outcomes are linked is given by 
the decision rule: 
Definition 4.2 A decision rule is a function which maps ordered sets of indi-
vidual actions into outcomes. 
Thus, a decision rule is an action guiding norm which states which or-
dered sets of actions generate which outcome.4 A second component we re-
quire for our definition of a decision-making mechanism is that of a deci-
sion-making procedure: 
Definition 4.3 A decision-making procedure provides the course of actions of 
the actors for a collective decision and states which set of actions are 
counted, i.e. which actions go into the domain of the decision rule. 
Now we can define a decision-making mechanism: 
Definition 4.4 A decision rule together with a decision-making procedure 
establishes a decision-making mechanism (DMM). 
                       
4 To put it into the language of causality: a decision rule defines the set of all necessary and 
sufficient conditions for each outcome, i.e. for each outcome it defines a set of sets of actions 
where each set of actions is sufficient for that outcome. 
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The canonical set-up for a DMM τ in a hierarchy as found in the power 
literature is characterized by the following set of assumptions: 
Assumption 4.5 Proposals submitted to the hierarchy are exogenous: it is 
the task of the hierarchy either to accept or to reject the proposal, i.e. we 
have a binary outcome set { }, .acceptance rejection=O  
Assumption 4.6 A proposal can be submitted to the hierarchy only once. 
Assumption 4.7 A hierarchy contains a finite set of members N =  
{ }, ,...,a b n  whose actions bring about the decision of the hierarchy. 
Assumption 4.8 Each actor i N∈  has a binary action set { },iA yes no=  
where yes means that i supports a proposal and no that i rejects the proposal. 
Assumptions (4.5)–(4.8) are also common in the analysis of power in 
non-hierarchical organisations. In addition for hierarchies we need to as-
sume: 
Assumption 4.9 The direction of the decision-making procedure through 
the hierarchy is bottom-up. 
Assumption 4.10 New proposals can only be received by those actors 
N N⊆  who have a contact to the outside world, i.e. to actors i N∉  submit-
ting the proposals. 
Assumption 4.11 Only certain subsets of N  can receive a new proposal at 
the same time. The set of such feasible subsets is given by 2 .N⊆ N  
Assumption 4.12 If N ′ ∈ N  receives a new proposal its members have to 
choose their individual actions. Depending on the DMM, these actions ei-
ther establish a final decision on behalf of the hierarchy or they imply that 
the proposal is forwarded to the next higher rank in the hierarchy. Here 
1ˆ ( )N− ′S  defines the set of all superiors who may be involved in the deci-
sion about that proposal received by N ′  until a final decision on behalf of 
the hierarchy is made. 
Assumption 4.13 If a proposal is forwarded to the next higher rank, there 
is a set of minimal feasible sub-sets of superiors 1 1ˆ ˆ( ) ( )min N N− −′ ′⊆S S  whose 
actions are required for the decision about a new proposal that has been 
presented to .N ′  
Assumptions (4.9)–(4.13) require some justification. Let us begin with 
the very basic rationale of a hierarchy: why may it be useful to have a hierar-
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chy. Why do we have organisations with dominance structures? A common 
answer to this question says that hierarchies are cost saving because domi-
nance structures allow for the decentralisation of decision-making (delega-
tion), i.e. by dividing tasks between the members of the different ranks and 
positions. In our context delegation means that we can avoid that all mem-
bers of an organisation are always involved in all decisions. Hence, DMMs in 
hierarchies imply that in certain instances particular actors are intentionally 
excluded from decisions (see, for instance, Mackenzie 1976: 103). This is 
usually achieved by a combination of two basic principles: (i) by reducing 
the breadth of the hierarchy involved in a particular decision and (ii) by al-
lowing non-top actors to make certain types of final decisions on behalf of 
the whole hierarchy even before one of their superiors has been involved. It 
would therefore be natural, that a generic DMM for a hierarchy should take 
those principles into account.  
To investigate whether such a generic DMM also satisfies assumptions 
(4.9)–(4.13) we need to determine if there exists a reasonable example 
based on the very simple hierarchy given by Figure 1c that fulfils both prin-
ciples (i) and (ii) and the assumptions. 
Example 4.14 Assume that a hierarchy with a dominance structure as 
given by Figure 1c is a development agency with a being its head and b and c 
being representatives in different developing countries. Moreover, assume 
that b and c receive funding applications for development projects, i.e. they 
have a contact to the outside world, while a does not. Suppose that the deci-
sion-making on these applications is delegated to b and c according to the 
above two principles. Based on principle (i) each representative is only re-
sponsible for the projects in his country, i.e. is not involved in decisions for 
the other country. If applications arrive at the desk of one of the represen-
tatives (b or c), this representative decides on them only together with a. 
Furthermore, based on principle (ii), if a representative (b or c) receives an 
application, he is entitled to reject it without contacting a (he can exclude a 
from the decision-making in this particular instance) although for an ap-
proval he requires the consent of a.5 
Thus, due to principle (i) a decision will never require the whole breath 
of the hierarchy (b and c together) to take part in a decision which implies 
that never all three actors are involved in a decision. In terms of its DMM 
the hierarchy is truncated twice, i.e. for each actor with a contact to the out-
side world we obtain a truncated hierarchy containing this actor and all his 
superiors. 6 To put it into other words: we have an ensemble of possible games 
                       
5 For an overview of further DMMs that can be derived from the literature on positional 
power in hierarchies see the appendix. 
6 Formally this phenomenon can also taken as abstention, although in this case it is decreed 
rather than voluntary. 
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on N with overlapping sets of actors, i.e. { }1 ,N a b=  and { }2 ,N a c= .7 
Whether b or c will be excluded from the decision-making (which possible 
game will be played) depends on who receives the new proposal. Moreover, 
due to principle (ii) all non-top actors are entitled to make a certain type of 
final decision on behalf of the whole hierarchy. This also means that princi-
ple (ii) implies a sequential decision-making procedure as it entitles non-
top actors to terminate the collective decision-making, before actors on 
higher ranks are involved. 
Now let us determine if Example (4.14) and, thus, the application of the 
above principles, match with assumptions (4.9)–(4.13). Obviously, Assump-
tion 4.9 is fulfilled. Moreover, the same applies to the remaining assump-
tions: { },N b c=  (4.10), { } { }{ },b c=N  (4.11), { }( ) { }( ) { }1 1ˆ ˆb c a− −= =S S   
(4.12), and { }( ) { }( ) { }1 1ˆ ˆmin minb c a− −= =S S  (4.13). However, note that these 
assumptions do not take into account that principle (ii) implies a sequential 
decision-making procedure. An essential characteristic of DMMs in hierar-
chies is overlooked. 
5. Decision-Making Mechanisms and Extensive Game Forms 
For modelling a DMM in a hierarchy the extant literature applies the clas-
sical membership-based approach. However, this is inappropriate because it 
does not allow for the exclusion of agents based on principle (ii) nor does it 
allow for the bottom-up structure of the decision-making procedure (As-
sumption 4.9). Both exclusion and bottom-up decision-making require a 
sequential structure while the membership-based approach is inherently 
simultaneous (see Section 7). Hence, we suggest the natural method is an 
action-based approach that makes use of an extensive game form (EGF) as de-
fined below. 
Let { }1,...,N n=  be the set of actors of a collective decision making body 
and *  defN N θ= ∪  where θ   denotes ‘nature’ which behaves randomly, i.e. 
θ ’s behaviour represents the exogenous effects of the outside world on N. 
The actors are part of a tree of a game form. This is a labelled tree ( , , )l lV DT  
where (i) l V  assigns to each non-terminal node j ∈V  exactly one *i N∈  
and to each terminal node  k ∈V  an outcome (k)∈ Oo  with O  being a 
non-empty finite outcome set, and (ii) l D  assigns to each arc a move a A∈  
where A denotes the set of all possible moves for all *.i N∈  
                       
7 The idea of a possible game has been introduced in the context of abstention (see 
Braham and Steffen 2002). Assume a DMM under which abstention is permissible for any actor 
.i N∈  Hence, a decision can be made by any subset 2 .NkN ⊆  Here any game played on kN  is 
called a possible game on N. Note that the idea of a possible game is different to that of a com-
posed game (Shapley 1962). In case of a composed game all components of the game can be 
played at the same time, while out of the set of possible games only one will be played. 
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In a tree of a game form a non-terminal node is called a decision-making node 
if it is owned by an actor ,i N∈  and a chance node if it is owned by θ . 
Moreover, we denote the set of nodes owned by an actor i by .V J  
An information set for an actor i is a set of nodes h J  such that in a deci-
sion-making procedure i knows that he must make the ‘next decision’, at 
some node j ∈h J , but due to his lack of information of the ‘history’ of the 
decision-making procedure i does not know at which node j ∈h J  exactly he 
must make his decision; i only knows that j ∈h J . Necessary conditions of an 
information set for an actor i are that (i) all nodes of h J  are owned by i; (ii) 
no node of h J  is related to any other node of h J , i.e. if ,j h ∈h J , then j  is 
neither an ancestor nor a descendant of h; and (iii) all nodes of h J  are 
equivalent for i with respect to the outgoing arcs, i.e. the number and label-
ling of arcs starting from each node j ∈h J  is the same. Moreover, let us 
denote the set of all information sets of an actor i by ,iH  i.e. 
{ }1,.., .i def i ip=H h h  Note, that if the set of nodes of a tree of a game form is 
*,N  i.e. it includes θ , we follow the convention that nodes belonging to 
nature are always elements of singleton information sets 
Now we can characterise an EGF.8 
Definition 5.1 An EGF is a tree of a game form such that the decision-
nodes have been partitioned into information sets that belong to the actors. 
In an EGF we call : 2i i → VC V  the choice function of an actor *,i N∈  if 
( ) ( )i j jC = S  for all .ij ∈V  Thus, a choice function assigns to each ij ∈V  
its corresponding set of successors ( )jS  in the tree of the game form (it as-
signs to each ij ∈V  the nodes that i can reach being in j and making a 
move). 
Furthermore, we say that i ‘has chosen’, if i has to make a move in a node 
ij ∈V  and has decided for a move to a node ( ).h j∈ S  For all i N∈  we 
call such choices of a move an action of i in j, denoted by .jia  The set of all 
actions available to i at a node ij ∈V  is called the action set of i at j, de-
noted by ,jiA  i.e. { }1,..., .j j jdefi imiA a a=  The set of all actions available to i at 
any node in iV  is denoted by Ai, i.e. { }: .ji def i iA j A= ∪ ∈V  
If instead nature θ moves, it’s moves – if they are non-fictitious – are not 
actions of intention, but just moves (determining which ‘real’ actor has to 
choose next) which follow a probability distribution resulting from a func-
tion : [0,1]p Aθ θ× →H  that assigns probabilities to the ‘actions’ at informa-
tion sets where nature moves, satisfying :θ θ∀ ∈h H  { }: ( ) 1.j j ja A j p aθθ θ θ∈ ∈ =∑ h  
Next, let us say that for an *,i N∈  .ij ∈V  and j ji ia A∈  in an EGF, 
( , )jih j a  denotes that node ( )h j∈ S  such that ( , ) ,jil j h a=D  i.e. ( , )jih j a  is 
                       
8 For more details about extensive game forms we refer the reader to Kolpin (1988, 1989) 
and for extensive form games to Kuhn (1953) and Selten (1975). 
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that node that is reached from node j, if i makes the move .jia  Based on this 
notation we can define an action profile in an EGF: 
Definition 5.2 An ‘action profile’ a  in an EGF is an ordered set of individ-
ual moves, 1( , ..., ),pjjdef a a=a  belonging to a subset of actors *( ) ,N N⊆a  
such that their moves form a path 1 1 1( , )pj j j+ = →P  2 1... pj j +→ →  with 
1
1 1( ) ,  ( ) ,pj j− += ∅ = ∅S S  and 1( , ) qjq ql j j a+ =D  for all { }1, ..., .q p∈  
Thus, an action profile a  is a ‘path of moves’ within the tree of the game 
form where the first move begins at the root 1r j=  and the last move ends 
at a terminal node 1.pk j +=  The set of all action profiles will be denoted by 
A  and by i ⊂A A  we will denote the subset of all action profiles that con-
tain an action of actor i.  
Notice that the action profiles in an EGF which represents a DMM con-
sider only counted individual actions and not all feasible individual actions. 
That is, these action profiles ignore those actions which actors have avail-
able and can perform but which are not counted by the decision-making 
procedure. 
Let us return to Example (4.14) which can now be represented by an 
EGF with { }* , , , ,N a b c θ=  { }, : , ,ji ij i N A yes no∀ ∈ ∈ =V  { ,acceptance=O  
Table 1. Choice Functions and Related Action Sets 
ij ∈V  ( )jS  jiA  
aj ∈V  { }, acceptance rejection  { }, yes no  
bj ∈V  { }, a rejection  { }, yes no  
cj ∈V  { }, a rejection  { }, yes no  
j θ∈V  { },b c  – 
Table 2. Action Profiles and Related Outcomes 
∈ Aa  ∈ Oo  
(b is allowed to choose
 
, yesb, yesa) acceptance 
(c is allowed to choose
 
, yesc, yesa) acceptance 
(b is allowed to choose
 
, yesb, noa) rejection 
(c is allowed to choose
 
, yesc, noa) rejection 
(b is allowed to choose
 
, nob) rejection 
(c is allowed to choose
 
, noc) rejection 
12 René van den Brink and Frank Steffen 
 
 
},rejection  : # # ,i ii N∀ ∈ =H V  and, thus, { }: .i ij j∀ ∈ ∈V H  Hence, we 
have an EGF with perfect information, i.e. the information sets are single-
tons and there is one information set ih  for each node j owned by i.9 Given 
the triple *( , , )N τ S  with τ denoting the DMM as described by Example 
(4.14) we obtain the choice functions and the individual action sets as given 
by Table 1. From these we can derive the action profiles containing the 
counted individual actions and their related outcomes as given by Table 2. 
What is left to be specified is the probability function determining 
nature’s moves, .p  It determines which actors with a contact to the outside 
world will obtain a proposal on their desk and, therefore, establishes which 
possible game will be played. In the absence of any (structural) information 
regarding the likelihood of N ′ ∈ N  to receive a new proposal, we apply the 
principle of insufficient reason of classical probability theory.10 This assigns 
equal probability to all admissible ‘atomic events’, i.e. in the present case 
equal probability to all N ′ ∈ N  for receiving a new proposal: 
                       
9 Note, that in a hierarchy an actor may own more than one decision node, even if he owns 
only one node in the dominance structure. 
10 In the absence of any information about the outside world the application of the princi-
ple of insufficient reason appears to be legitimate here as we fulfil the condition that we have a 
finite probability space consisting of finitely many clearly distinguished indivisible ‘atomic 
events’ (Felsenthal et al. 2003). 
½
θ
b
yes
yes
no
no
a
c
yes
yes
no
no
a
acceptance
rejection
acceptance
rejection
rejection
rejection
½
 
Fig. 2. The DMM as an EGF
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( receives a new proposal) 1/p N #′ = N  
which implies that for each actor i N∈   his probability to receive a new pro-
posal is given by  
{ }ˆ( receives a new proposal) # /#p i N N i N′ ′∈ = ∈ ∈ N N.  
We can now give a proper graphical representation of a DMM as an EGF. 
For Example (4.14) this is given by Figure 2. From Section 4 we know that 
we have two possible games with { }1 ,N a b=  and { }2 , .N a c=  Moreover, we 
have { } { }{ },b c=N  which implies that each possible game occurs with 
probability 12 .  In the EGF this is reflected by the assignment of this 
probability to the moves of nature which lead to the branches T b  and T c  
representing the possible games. 
6. Measuring Positional Power: An Action-Based Approach 
Our understanding of ‘power’ is based on Harré (1970) and Morriss 
(1987/2002) who define power as a concept that always refers to a generic 
(and therefore, in a sense, timeless) ability or capacity of an object. In a 
social context this object is an actor and a power ascription refers to his abil-
ity: what the actor is able to do against the resistance of at least some other 
actor. Following Braham (2007) we say that an actor i has power with re-
spect to a certain outcome if i has an action (or sequence of actions) such 
that the performance of the action under the stated or implied conditions 
will result in that outcome despite the actual or possible resistance of at 
least some other actor. That is, power is a claim about what i is able to do 
against some resistance of others irrespective of the actual occurrence of 
the resistance. Thus, power is a capacity or potential which exists whether it is 
exercised or not. In our context, this capacity is based on the positions of 
the actors in an organisation. 
The measurement of power involves the following steps: (i) The identifi-
cation of the action profiles within the organisation that are sufficient for 
bringing about an outcome. (ii) The ascription of power to an individual 
actor in these action profiles by determining if the actor has an action that 
if performed will, ceteris paribus, alter the outcome of the collective action. 
(iii) The aggregation of the individual power ascriptions of each actor, giv-
ing us a bare power score. (iv) The weighting of the aggregated power ascrip-
tions yields to a power measure. If this weighting is such that all aggregated 
power ascriptions sum up to unity we say that we have a power index. The 
difference between a score and a measure rests in the comparability of 
power structures: a score allows for ordinal comparisons only, while a meas-
ure allows for cardinal comparisons. 
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In Section 5 we already described and illustrated step (i) (see Table 2). 
Thus, we can immediately proceed with step (ii). To ascribe power to an 
actor we examine for each action profile a  whether i has an action,11 
which, if chosen, can make a decisive difference to the outcome against the 
actual or possible resistance of at least some other actor. That is, we deter-
mine if a given actor i has a swing. 
To define a swing in an EGF let {(ˆ ) there is a pathdefg = ∈O o O  
} ( , ) with ( )  and ( ) ,g k k k= ∅P S =o o  i.e. (ˆ )gO  is a relation between a deci-
sion node ig ∈V  and the outcome set ˆO that can be achieved from this 
node.12 Based on this relation we have: 
Definition 6.1 A swing of an actor i is a triple ( , , )l lj ji ia aa   with 
1( , ..., )pjja a=a  being an action profile and actions ,l l lj j ii i ia a A∈  for which 
there are two decision nodes l ij ∈V  and ( )k lj j∈ S  that are reached by 
profile a  and a decision node { }( ) \ ,l kg j j∈ S  such that ( , ) ,ljl k il j j a=D  
( , ) ,ljl il j g a= D  and { }(ˆ ) \ ( ) .pjg a ≠ ∅O o  
Hence, i has a swing, if i can alter the resulting outcome ( )pjao  of an 
action profile a  by, ceteris paribus, changing his action .ljia  
At this point it is important to draw attention to the interpretation of the 
ceteris paribus condition. In the context of collective decision-making it is 
commonly said to imply that the actions of all other actors remain constant 
(in all information sets). That is, if i alters his action the only effect that can 
result out of this is a change in the outcome (then we say that i has a swing 
and we ascribe power to i). While this ‘all other things being equal’ inter-
pretation is appropriate for a simultaneous DMM, it no longer applies for 
our more general case of a sequential DMM, which may allow certain actors 
to exclude other actors from the decision-making as a result of their choices 
(see principle (ii) in Section 4). If we have an action profile i∈ Aa  and we 
alter i ’s action ljia  in a  it can happen that the decision-making process re-
quires either the exclusion of actions of other actors ljia
′
′  from the domain 
of the decision rule and, hence, from action profile a , or the inclusion of 
actions by other actors ljia
′
′  in the domain of the decision rule and, there-
fore, in action profile a . If such information would be ignored, we can end 
up with an inappropriate power ascription resulting out of the alteration of 
i ’s action.  
In order to avoid this problem and to capture this information we have 
to go back to the idea behind the literal ‘all other things being equal’ inter-
pretation of the ceteris paribus clause. The basic idea of the ceteris paribus 
clause is a comparison between two possible worlds: the world as it is (our 
                       
11 The literature on power commonly uses the term ‘strategy’ as a synonym for an ‘action’ 
(see Miller 1982; Braham and Steffen 2003; Braham and Holler 2005) even if power is defined 
as the ability of an actor to effect outcomes by his chosen actions and not by his plan of action.  
12 Note, that we allow ( , )g kP  to be a direct path, but not to be a degenerated path. 
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initial action profile a  and its associated outcome ( )pjao ) and the world as 
it would be if an action were changed (the resulting action profile and its 
associated outcome if i ’s action ljia  were altered). In contrast to the stan-
dard interpretation of the ceteris paribus clause our analysis does not neces-
sarily require that all other components of the action profile remain con-
stant after we altered i ’s action; it requires that the action profiles after the 
initial change by one actor are consistent with the DMM. Hence, this inter-
pretation of the ceteris paribus clause which is underlying Definition (6.1) 
is able to capture the above mentioned aspects of a sequential DMM.13 
If an actor i has a swing, we can distinguish between two different types of 
swings: 
Definition 6.2 A swing ( , , )l lj ji ia aa   of an actor i is strong if (ˆ ) 1,g =#O  and 
weak if (ˆ ) 1,g >#O  with g as given in Definition 6.1. 
Note, that for a swing ( , , )l lj ji ia aa   and g as given in Definition 6.1, 
(ˆ ) 1g =#O  implies that the unique outcome in (ˆ )gO  is different from the 
outcome ( )pjao  of the action profile a  since by definition of a swing (ˆ )gO  
contains at least one outcome that is different than ( ).pjao  Thus, a strong 
swing enables an actor to alter a unique outcome into another unique out-
come, while a weak swing only enables an actor to alter a unique outcome 
into a non-unique outcome.  
The distinction between strong and weak swings is novel and becomes 
necessary due to the sequential structure of our approach. Both swings are 
immediately comparable if we have set inclusion, i.e. a strong swing 
( , , )l lj ji ia aa   and a weak swing ( , , )l lj ji ia a′ ′ ′a   with g and ,g ′  respectively, as 
given in Definition (6.1) are comparable if ˆ ˆ( ) ( ).g g ′⊂O O  In this case 
which applies to our binary set-up, a strong swing implies more power (or 
ability) than a weak swing as the outcome that an actor with a strong swing 
can enforce is more specific. Moreover, for a binary set-up the literature dis-
tinguishes between positive and negative swings: 
Definition 6.3 For a DMM represented by an EGF with ,ij∀ ∈V  
{ }: ,iji N A yes no∈ =  and { },acceptance rejection=O  an actor i has a positive 
swing, if i by switching from a ‘no’- to a ‘yes’-action can alter the outcome 
from a ‘rejection’ to an ‘acceptance’ and has a negative swing, if i by switching 
from a ‘yes’- to a ‘no’-action can alter the outcome from an ‘acceptance’ to a 
‘rejection’. 
                       
13 Note that the ceteris paribus clause in Definition (6.1) also guarantees the fulfillment of 
the resistance condition (see Braham 2007). 
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Definition 6.4 Let { }1, ..., zi i iS s s=  be the set of all swings of an actor i 
where each is  denotes a swing ( , , ),l lj ji ia aa   Moreover, let siS  and wiS  de-
note the sets of strong and weak swings of i respectively. 
For step (iii), the individual power ascriptions for each actor given by iS  
are aggregated in order to obtain a complete and transitive relation ‘at least 
as powerful as for o ’, ,o?  defined over .N 14 
To aggregate the individual power ascriptions we have to take into ac-
count the existence of nature, or in other words: the potential exclusion of 
actors from the decision-making due to principle (i) (exclusion due to 
principle (ii) is already taken into account via the action profiles). We ob-
tain this by weighting each swing on a branch T j  with ij ∈V  and i N∈   
with the likelihood that nature will choose this branch. For the EGF this 
implies that 1: ( ) ,j jθ −∃ ∈ = ∅V S  i.e. that nature owns the root r of the 
tree of the game form, and, hence, makes the first move. Furthermore, for 
our analysis we assume # 1,θ =V  i.e. that nature owns only one node being 
the root.15 
Definition 6.5 Let ( )a θ ∈p a  be the likelihood that nature chooses the 
move a θ  that is part of the action profile a , and ( )isa  be the action profile 
in a swing ( , , ).l lj ji i is a a= a   Then ( ( ))ia sθ ∈p a  denotes the likelihood that 
nature chooses the move that is part of the action profile a  in swing .is  
Note: (i) If in the (original) EGF 1: ( ) ,j jθ −∃ ∈ = ∅V S  # 1,θ =V  and 
# 1N ′ =  for all ,N ′ ∈ N  due to the principle of insufficient reason we have 
( ) ( receives a new proposal) 1/ .a p N #θ ′∈ = =p Na  (ii) If in the (original) 
EGF ,θ = ∅V  i.e. if nature does not exist, we can represent this EGF by a 
strategically equivalent EGF with 1: ( ) ,j jθ −∃ ∈ = ∅V S  # 1,θ =V  and 
# 1,Aθ =  which implies # 1,=N  and, hence, ( ) ( receives aa p Nθ ′∈ =p a  
new proposal) 1.=  
Definition 6.6 The power score of an actor i N∈  in a decision-making 
situation represented by an EGF is given by { :*( , , ) si def i iN s Sη τ = ∈∑S  
                       
14 Note, that here , :i j N i j∀ ∈ o?  is to be interpreted as ‘i ’s degree of power to force o  is 
at least as great as j ’s degree of power to force o ’, with ;o  and ∼o  denoting the asymmetric 
and symmetric components of o? , i.e. ;o  denotes ‘the greater degree of power’ and ∼o  
‘the same degree of power’. 
15 Although this assumption might appear to be quite strong, it does not impose any restric-
tion on the applicability of our approach to DMMs represented by EGFs. Naturally, it can hap-
pen that for certain DMMs 1: ( ) ,j jθ −∃ ∈ ≠ ∅V S  i.e. that nature owns also other nodes than 
the root. However, in these cases, it is easy to proof via a backward induction procedure, that 
we can represent the original EGF by a strategically equivalent one where we have merged the 
nodes ,j θ∈V  such that # 1θ =V  and 1( )j− = ∅S  for .j θ∈V  
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} { }:( ( )) ( ( ))wi i iia s s S a sθ θε∈ + ∈ ⋅ ∈∑p pa a  with 0 1ε< <  to take into ac-
count the nature of weak swings.16 
From Definition (6.1) it follows that in this case o?  is a cardinality-based 
ranking such that , : .i ji j N i j η η∀ ∈ → ≥o?  
In order to obtain a power measure allowing for cardinal comparisons, 
we have to continue with step (iv) by applying different weightings to the 
action profiles and, thus, to the related power ascriptions (to the swings of 
the actors). From Definition (6.6) we can derive the natural analogue to the 
Banzhaf measure β ′  which is formulated in the language of the member-
ship-based approach (Banzhaf 1965, Felsenthal und Machover 1998).17 We 
obtain this analogue for an actor i N∈  by weighting the score with the 
weighted sum of ‘potential swings’ of i in all action profiles .i∈ Aa  Here the 
weight of each action profile a  is determined by the likelihood that nature 
chooses this profile, i.e. ( ).a θ ∈p a  The number of potential swings of i in 
each profile a  results out of the sum of alternative actions { }\j j ji i ia A a∈  
actor i has at hand for each action :jia ∈ a  
Definition 6.7 The power measure of an actor i N∈  in a decision-making 
situation represented by an EGF is given by 
{ } { }
{ }{ }
: :
:
*
( ( )) ( ( ))
( , , )
: ( ) ( ) (# 1)
s w
i i i ii i
i def
j
i i i
s S a s s S a s
N
a j A
θ θ
θ
εβ τ ∈ ∈ + ∈ ⋅ ∈′ = ∈ ∈ ∈ −
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
p p
S
A p V
a a
a a a
  
where ( )iV a  is the set of decision nodes ij ∈V  that are reached by .a  
Now let us return to Example (4.14). For the analysis of the power struc-
ture of this example we start by exploring the actors’ swings. From Figure 2 
we know that a owns two nodes: one in each possible game, while b and c 
own one node in ‘their’ possible game. In each node each actor has two 
actions. Examining the effects of altering, ceteris paribus, the actions for all 
                       
16 Note, that for the binary DMMs which are discussed in the literature (see Appendix) it is 
not necessary to specify the value of ε as these DMMs all include (i) bottom-up procedures 
which (ii) always requires the presence of the top for an approval: (i) ensures that the top is 
the only one who owns a positive strong swing, while (ii) guarantees that the top is at least 
never less powerful than any other actor if a dominance structure satisfies properties (3.1)–
(3.8). If we want to specify the value of ε, we could be tempted to think about an actor de-
pendent operator iε . However, this would make the power of an actor i additionally depend-
ent on the actions and, thus, the powers of his subsequent actors in the EGF – something which 
is in contradiction to our dispositional concept of power, i.e. that the power of an actor i is 
what i is able to do when he is in the position to act. 
17 The derivation of other analogues of well known power measures, such as the Shapley-
Shubik (1954) index is left to future research. 
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actors shows that a has a positive and a negative strong swing in each of the 
two games, whereas b and c only have one positive weak and one negative 
strong swing each.  
Let us have a closer look at b’s situation. If b switches from ‘no’ to ‘yes’ b 
can exclude a straightforward rejection against the resistance of all other 
actors performing any feasible action, and if b switches from a ‘yes’ to ‘no’, b 
can ensure a straightforward rejection against the resistance of all other 
actors performing any feasible action. Furthermore, and as already indi-
cated above, here the ceteris paribus clause for b implies not only that b has 
an effect on the outcome but also on a’s action: by switching his action b de-
termines whether a – according to the DMM – has to act or not and whether 
a’s action is counted, i.e. if b opts for ‘yes’ a is obliged to act and his action is 
counted, while if b chooses ‘no’ a is neither obliged to act nor his action is 
counted. Thus, a switch in b’s action forces us either to consider an action 
performed by a which was not counted or even not existent before, or to ig-
nore an originally counted action performed by a. However, the sole effect 
of b on a is something which is irrelevant for our analysis which is con-
cerned with the question whether b has the ability to affect the outcome at 
that decision-making node. 
Taking into account that each possible game occurs with equal probabil-
ity, it is obvious that a is more powerful than b and c and that b and c have 
equal power, i.e. .a b c; ∼P P  Applying Definition (6.6) and (6.7) we obtain 
the following power distributions which reflect this ordering: 
*
*
( , , ) (2.00, 0.50 0.50 , 0.50 0.50 )
( , , ) (1.00,0.33 0.33 , 0.33 0.33 ).
N
N
η ε ε
β ε ε
τ
τ
= + +
′ = + +
S
S  
7. Measuring Positional Power: Pathologies of the Membership-
Based Approaches 
We mentioned earlier that the literature on the measurement of positional 
power in non-hierarchical organisations is usually founded on a member-
ship-based approach. We also stated that the membership-based approach is 
not suitable to deal with the particularities of DMMs which are typical for 
hierarchical organisations. To see why, let us start with the canonical set-up 
of the membership-based approach. This is represented by a simple game. 
Definition 7.1 A simple game (SG) is a pair ( , )N W  where W  is a collection 
of subsets (coalitions) of the set of actors N called the set of winning 
coalitions, which satisfies the following three conditions: ;∅ ∉ W  ;N ∈ W  
and (monotonicity) if T ∈ W  and ,T T ′⊆  then .T ′ ∈ W  A subset T N⊆  is 
said to be winning or losing according to whether T ∈ W  or .T ∉ W  
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Furthermore, a subset T is called minimal winning iff ,T ∈ W  but no subset 
of T is in W . The set of minimal winning subsets is denoted by M . 
Hence, a DMM represented by a SG can be either represented by W  or 
due to the monotonicity condition by M , where a coalition T can be re-
garded as an ‘index’ of the actions of the actors which have chosen the 
same action, for instance, ‘yes’, if .T ∈ W  
Now, let us investigate the degree to which a SG is able to meet Assump-
tions (4.5) and (4.7)–(4.13) and both principles discussed in Section 4. This 
will provide us with an idea about the limitations of this approach and how 
we can convert the membership-based approach founded on a SG into a 
special case of our action-based approach. 
Like our EGF the definition of a SG is also based on a finite set of actors 
N (Assumption 4.7). The binary structure of the decision-making situation, 
i.e. the individual binary action sets (Assumption 4.8) and the binary out-
come set (Assumption 4.5) are taken into account via the membership of 
actors in winning or losing subsets of actors. An actor establishes his mem-
bership of such a subset by his individual action, i.e. by either supporting or 
rejecting a proposal. Thus, what a SG does is that it subdivides all actors sub-
ject to their individual actions to belong either to T or \N T  where T con-
tains those actors who “get their way” according to the DMM, i.e. whose in-
dividual actions corresponds to the collective outcome.18 The fact that new 
proposals can only be received by actors with a contact to the outside world 
(Assumption 4.10) is taken into account by the requirement that 
: .T T N∀ ∈ ∩ ≠ ∅M  The assumption that only subsets of N  can receive a 
new proposal at the same time (Assumption 4.11) is currently not taken into 
account by the existing membership-based approaches but could be incor-
porated by applying the idea of possible games with overlapping sets of 
actors. The same applies if a collective decision does not require the whole 
breath of a hierarchy, i.e. principle (i) (see Example 4.14). The information 
that in certain instances particular actors i are able to determine the collec-
tive decision by their individual action (Assumptions 4.12 and 4.13) can be 
considered via veto rights, i.e. that : .T i T∀ ∈ ∈M  
What remains is the bottom-up direction of the decision-making proce-
dure (Assumption 4.9) and the assumption that particular actors might be 
able to make certain types of final decisions on behalf of the whole hier-
archy even before one of their superiors has been involved (principle ii). 
Both cannot be taken into account by a SG because they require a sequen-
tial structure while a SG is inherently simultaneous.  
                       
18 Note, that this additionally requires the usual assumption that the simple game is self-
dual, i.e. that any binary division of actors results in exactly one winning and one losing subset 
(Taylor and Zwicker 1999). 
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A SG only considers the memberships of actors in T ∈ W  or T ∉ W , but 
not when the actors join such subsets. Thus, it implicitly assumes that all ac-
tors join the subsets at the same time. Hence, the membership-based SG set-
up can be represented by an EGF with simultaneous individual actions. Put 
it differently: by an EGF with imperfect information such that there is one 
information set containing all nodes owned by i, i.e. : # 1ii N∀ ∈ =H  and 
i i=h V .19 
Thus, the major difference between our and the existing approaches is 
that they differ in the assumptions of the information sets. This has far-
reaching consequences. Not only are the trees of the game form considera-
bly different (see Figure 3 for the EGF of Example 4.14 with imperfect in-
formation), but also the power structure. 
Altering the information sets of Example (4.14) in the appropriate way 
we obtain *( , , ) (6.00, 2.00, 2.00)Nη τ =S  and *( , , ) (0.75, 0.25,Nβ τ′ =S  
0.25).  The ordering is the same, but a becomes relatively more powerful 
                       
19 Note, that a DMM represented by a SG can also be represented by a strategic game form 
(SGF) with unconditional actions (Miller 1982) which implies that a SGF with conditional 
actions is an alternative of equal rank to the EGF we suggest here. 
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Fig. 3. An EGF representation of a SG
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than b and c. This is due to the fact that in a simultaneous decision-making 
structure – in contrast to a sequential structure – all feasible individual 
actions are counted. However, the effects of ignoring the sequential struc-
ture of a DMM in a hierarchy and instead applying an approach with a si-
multaneous structure might be stronger than in this example, i.e. it might 
change the power ordering of the actors. 
Example 7.2 Assume a hierarchy with the dominance structure given by 
Figure 1b. Applying the membership-based set-up we have *N N= =  
{ }, , ,a b c { }, : , ,i ijj i N A yes no∀ ∈ ∈ =V : # # ,i ii N∀ ∈ =H V  and :ij∀ ∈V  
{ } ,ij ∈ H  and { }, .acceptance rejection=O  Concerning the DMM τ  let us 
assume that only c has contact to the outside world, i.e. { } { }{ },N c= = N  
that the decision-making procedure is bottom-up, and that each actor is 
able to reject a proposal on behalf of the whole hierarchy if it arrives at his 
desk and he rejects it – which implies that subsequent individual actions 
should not be counted – while an acceptance of a proposal requires the 
approval of all three actors. Then we obtain *( , , ) (2.00, 1.00 ,Nη τ ε= +S  
1.00 ,)ε+  and *( , , ) (1.00, 0.33Nβ τ′ = +S 0.33 , 0.25 0.25 ),ε ε+  while in 
case of : # 1ii N∀ ∈ =H  and ,i i=h V  i.e. under a simultaneous structure 
with { }{ }, , ,a b c= =W M  we would obtain *( , , ) (2.00, 2.00, 2.00)Nη τ =S  
and *( , , ) (0.25, 0.25 0.25).Nβ τ′ =S  Hence, the power ordering a b c; ;o o  
based on the power measure taking into account the sequential nature 
would be misrepresented by a b c∼ ∼o o  under the simultaneous structure. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
We would like to tie up this paper with a brief summary of our results and 
some remarks. We provided an action-based framework for the analysis of 
positional power in organisational architectures which is able to take into 
account the particularities of hierarchical structures, For this reason our 
approach is more general than the usual membership-based approach 
which does not allow for sequential DMMs. Moreover, we demonstrated that 
if it is still applied to a sequential DMM it may result in inappropriate cardi-
nal and ordinal power structures as it ascribes power to actors in action pro-
files which should not be counted. 
In order to measure an actors’ power we have extended the notion of a 
swing from a simultaneous to a sequential set-up and aggregated the indi-
vidual power ascriptions over all action profiles of which an actor is a mem-
ber. This is in line with our definition of power as a generic ability which is a 
conditional disposition that exists irrespective whether it is exercised or not.  
For the derivation of our power measure in Definition (6.7) from our 
power score in Definition (6.6) we divided the score of an actor i by the 
weighted sum of his potential swings. Even though this reflects perfectly 
what the Banzhaf measure is doing for the simultaneous case, it is not so in-
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nocent as it seems to be – even for our binary set-up. While under the simul-
taneous structure all actors are members of all action profiles and, hence, 
each actor has the same chance to have a swing in each action profile, this is 
no longer necessarily the case under the sequential set-up. A consequence 
of this is that our power score and measure are not necessarily co-mono-
tone, i.e. Felsenthal et al’s (1998) price monotonicity postulate is violated. 
Finally, we have to acknowledge that the suggested approach currently 
does not take into account the case of differing incentive structures between 
the actors, i.e. that actors have a damatis personae : they are the bearers of 
predetermined attributes and modes of behaviour. Actors in hierarchies of-
ten play predetermined roles, such as salesman, financial officer, head of 
external affairs, etc., which are equipped with a bundle of incentive struc-
tures that also belong to the organisational architecture. Steffen (2002) ar-
gues that a proper measurement of power should take such information 
into account if it is available. For the membership-based approach Straffin’s 
(1977, 1978) partial homogeneity approach offers a solution to this prob-
lem. Even though we expect that the same idea could be applied to our 
action-based approach, this, as well as the axiomatization of our measure, 
are issues for future research. 
Appendix 
Based on Assumptions (4.5)–(4.13) we can identify 12 DMMs from the lit-
erature on positional power in hierarchies (Table A.1). These differ in the 
explicit definitions of , ,N N  and 1ˆ ( )min N− ′S  as given by Assumptions (4.10), 
(4.11), and (4.13) while they all share the other assumptions with 
1ˆ− ′ =S (N )  { }1ˆ ( )j i i N− ′∈ ∈S  for Assumption (4.12). Furthermore, note, 
that i and j denote here actors in a dominance structure and not in an EGF. 
Table A.1 
N?  N  1ˆ ( )N− ′Smin  
N  N?  { }{ }1 1ˆ ( ) ( )j i i N j− −′∈ ∈ ∧ = ∅S S  
N  N?  { }1 1ˆ( , ) ( ) ( )i j i N j i j− −′∈ ∧ ∈ ∧ = ∅P S S  
N  N?  { }{ }1ˆ ( )j i i N− ′∈ ∈S  
N  { }2 # 1N′ ′∈ =N N? { }{ }1 1ˆ ( ) ( )j i i N j− −′∈ ∈ ∧ = ∅S S  
N  { }2 # 1N′ ′∈ =N N? { }1 1ˆ( , ) ( ) ( )i j i N j i j− −′∈ ∧ ∈ ∧ = ∅P S S  
N  { }2 # 1N′ ′∈ =N N? { }{ }1ˆ ( )j i i N− ′∈ ∈S  
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… / Table A.1 
N?  N  1ˆ ( )N− ′Smin  
{ }( )i N i∈ = ∅S  N?  { }{ }1 1ˆ ( ) ( )j i i N j− −′∈ ∈ ∧ = ∅S S  
{ }( )i N i∈ = ∅S  N?  { }1 1ˆ( , ) ( ) ( )i j i N j i j− −′∈ ∧ ∈ ∧ = ∅P S S  
{ }( )i N i∈ = ∅S  N?  { }{ }1ˆ ( )j i i N− ′∈ ∈S  
{ }( )i N i∈ = ∅S  { }2 # 1N′ ′∈ =N N? { }{ }1 1ˆ ( ) ( )j i i N j− −′∈ ∈ ∧ = ∅S S  
{ }( )i N i∈ = ∅S  { }2 # 1N′ ′∈ =N N? { }1 1ˆ( , ) ( ) ( )i j i N j i j− −′∈ ∧ ∈ ∧ = ∅P S S  
{ }( )i N i∈ = ∅S  { }2 # 1N′ ′∈ =N N? { }{ }1ˆ ( )j i i N− ′∈ ∈S  
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